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PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS

PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS UNDER ARTICLE VII,
SECTION 3(a) OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION OF 1968
Article VII, section 3 (a) of the constitution of 1968 combines in a
single section all constitutional provisions allowing tax exemptions to
property used for municipal, educational, literary, scientific, religious, or
charitable purposes:
All property owned by a municipality and used exclusively by it for
municipal or public purposes shall be exempt from taxation. A
municipality, owning property outside the municipality, may be
required by general law to make payment to the taxing unit in which
the property is located. Such portions of property as are used predominantly for educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable
purposes may be exempted by general law from taxation.
This in itself is a great improvement over the constitution of 1885, which
contained two separate provisions authorizing exemptions for property
devoted to such purposes. Article XVI, section 16,1 applied to corporate
4
owned property,2 while article IX, section 1,3 covered all other property.
The exemptions referred to in these sections applied only to ad valorem
taxes and not to excise or license taxes.5 Since both the old and new provisions refer to exemption from "taxation," the law will remain the same
with regard to this point.
Considerable uncertainty and controversy accompanied the application
6
of these two sections. Since article XVI, section 16, was, until recently, held
to be self-executing7 the question of which section applied to a given situation
was crucial.8 Article XVI, section 16, also required the property to be used

1. "Corporate property subject to taxation, exception.- The property of all corporations,
except the property of a corporation which shall construct a ship or barge canal across the
peninsula of Florida, if the Legislature should so enact, whether heretofore or hereafter
incorporated, shall be subject to taxation unless such property be held and used exclusively
for religious, scientific, municipal, educational, literary or charitable purposes."
2. Except property owned by nonprofit corporations. Rogers v. City of Leesburg, 157
Fla. 784, 27 So. 2d 70 (1946); FLA. STAT. §192.051 (1967).
3. "Uniform and equal rate of taxation; special rates.-The Legislature shall provide
for a uniform and equal rate of taxation . . . and shall prescribe such regulations as shall
secure a just valuation of all property, both real and personal, excepting such property
as may be exempted by law for municipal, education [sic], literary, scientific, religious or
charitable purposes."
4. For a good historical background of these two constitutional provisions, see Note,
The "Public Purpose" and "Charitable" Tax Exemption in Florida, A judicial Morass, 19
U. FLA. L. REv. 330, 330-31 (1966).
5. State v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 155 Fla. 403, 406, 20 So. 2d 397, 398 (1945); City
of Lakeland v. Amos, 106 Fla. 873, 143 So. 744 (1932).
6. Jasper v. Mease Manor, Inc., 208 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1968).
7. Lummus v. Miami Beach Congregational Church, 142 Fla. 657, 661, 195 So. 607,
608 (1940); Lummus v. Florida Adirondack School, 123 Fla. 810, 825, 168 So. 232, 239
(1936).
8. Especially since Act of May 14, 1937, ch. 18312, [1937] Fla. Laws 1124, which removed the requirement of sole use from Fla. Compiled Gen. Laws §897 (1927), the general
exemption statute under FMA. CONsr. art. IX, §1 (1885).
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exclusively for the exempted purpose. Article IX, section 1, however, was
not self-executing 9 but merely authorized the legislature discretionary power
to grant exemptions for the enumerated purposes. This section contained no
requirement of exclusive use. Thus, the two provisions each had their advantages and disadvantages to parties seeking exemptions, and such parties attempted to fit themselves into the category that appeared most likely to warrant an exemption. The fact that the same exemptions were covered by two
separate provisions, each with somewhat different requirements, resulted in
inequitable and inconsistent results ° and led the Florida courts into an almost
unintelligible morass of decisions."1
While some difficulties are eliminated by the consolidation of the two
provisions, quite a few other problems of interpretation arise from the
significant changes in wording contained in the new provision. It is the
purpose of this note to explore the effect of, and the apparent changes that
will be brought about by article VII, section 3 (a), of the constitution of
1968. Pursuant to this purpose, the old constitutional provisions and the
relevant tax exemption statutes will be considered.
LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY

Article VII, section 3 (a) of the new constitution had a somewhat erratic
history. In the final draft of the proposed constitution submitted to the
legislature by the Florida Constitutional Revision Commission the new
provision was article VIII, section 5 (b), which stated:
Any property used exclusively for municipal, educational, literary,
scientific, religious, charitable or public purposes may be exempted
by law from taxation.
This recommendation included a requirement of exclusive use and did not
require that exemptions be granted only by general law. Also, none of its
provisions were self-executing.
12
in House Joint Resolution 3-XXX (67) 13
The provision was unchanged
and Senate Joint Resolution 1-XXX (67) ,14 which were introduced as vehicles
9. Rast v. Hulvey, 77 Fla. 74, 81, 80 So. 750, 752 (1919).
10. E.g., Note, supra note 4, at 334.
11. See Note, supra note 4, at 333-37. In 1961, the legislature tried to clarify which
constitutional provision was to cover nonprofit corporations by passing Act of June 16, 1961,
ch. 61-266, §2, [1961] Fla. Laws 497, which is now FLA. STAT. §192.051 (1967). This stated
that article IX, §1, was to cover such corporations, and was in accord with Rogers v. City
of Leesburg, 157 Fla. 784, 27 So. 2d 70 (1946). In 1966, however, in Presbyterian Homes
of the Synod v. City of Bradenton, 190 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1966), the supreme court completely
ignored this statute and decided the case, which involved a nonprofit corporation, under
article XVI, §16. Under the new constitution the statute is unnecessary. See also Jasper v.
Mease Manor, Inc., 208 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1968).
12. Still article VIII, §5 (b).
13. 3 H.R. JouR. FLA. (special session July 31 to Aug. 19, 1967) 14.
14. S. JouR. FLA. (extra and special sessions 1966-1967) (special session July 31 to Aug.
19, 1967) 12.
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with which the legislature could work. Most of the controversial provisions
of the Constitutional Revision Commission's draft were removed'so as to
require an affirmative vote of the legislature for them to be included in the
document submitted to the voters. This procedure resulted in the proposal's
being referred to as a "pablum draft."' 5 Apparently it was thought that the
exemption provision in question was not sufficiently controversial to be
excluded from this pablum draft.
The senate and house of representatives proposed various amendments
to the provision, but when the two houses could not agree on this and various
other sections, a joint conference committee was appointed to make recommendations.16 Pursuant to the committee's report, the section as it is now
worded appeared in House Joint Resolution 1-2X (68), the legislature's final
version of the constitution, which was adopted on July 3, 1968,17 and ratified
by the voters on November 5, 1968.
MUNICIPAL OR PUBLIC PURPOSE EXEMPTION

The new provision states that "[a]ll property owned by a municipality and
used exclusively by it for municipal or public purposes shall be exempt from
taxation." While exemptions were authorized by the old constitution only
for property used for "municipal" purposes,' S section 192.06 (2) of the Florida
Statutes provides generally for exemption to "all public property of . . .
cities... used or intended for public purposes." The Florida supreme court
has used the words "municipal purpose," from the constitution, and "public
purpose," from the statute, interchangeably and held that they are synonymous.'19 This is the "liberal interpretation" of municipal purposes. 20 Since
the courts have construed these terms as synonymous, cases involving this
point c6ntinue to be good law even after the adoption of the new constitution,21 which contains both terms instead of only one or the other. Florida
15. Miami (Fla.) Herald, Aug. 3, 1967, §C, at 3, col. 7.
16. 3 H.R. Joum. FLA. (special session June 24 to July 3, 1968) 45, 47.
17. Id. at 99; S. Joux. FLA. (special sessions 1968) (special session June 24 to July 3,
1968) 132.
18. FLA. CONsT. art. IX, §1 (1885); FLA. CONST. art XVI, §16 (1885).
19. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist. v. Paul, 179 So. 2d 349, 355
(Fla. 1965); Gwin v. City of Tallahassee, 132 So. 2d 273, 276 (Fla. 1961).
20. Comment, State and Local Taxation: The Public Purpbse Exemption in Florida,
18 U. FA. L. REv. 708 n.3 (1966).
21. Several other provisions in the old constitution give rise to decisions on the nature
of a public purpose: (1) FA. CONSr. art. XVI, §29 (1885) (provided there must be a valid
public purpose for land to be taken by eminent domain); (2) FLA. CoNsT. art. IX, §6 (1885)
(provided that certain taxes could be levied only for municipal purposes); (3) FLA. CONsr.
art. IX, §10 (1885) (has been interpreted to mean that the state may pledge its credit only
for public purposes). State v. Jacksonville Port Authority, 204 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1967); State
v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1952). Cases interpreting these provisions are
often cited and accepted interchangeably by courts. E.g., Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist. v. Paul, 179 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1965) (a tax exemption case in which
the court relied upon State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist., 89 So.
2d 34 (Fla. 1956), the very case that had validated the bonds for the district).
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Statutes, section 192.06 (2), remains consistent with the new constitution on
this point.
An apparent change brought about by the new provision is that the
property must be "owned by a municipality and used exclusively by it for
municipal or public purposes." The requirement that the property be owned
by the municipality is present in the statute 2 2 but was not present in either
of the provisions of the old constitution.23 Conceivably, under the old constitution, property owned by a commercial corporation or any other legal
entity could be exempt if it were put to a valid public use.2 4 The character of
use, not the character of ownership, was the controlling criterion.2 5 This
does not appear to be the case under the new constitution. The provision
2 6
specifically provides that the property must be owned by a municipality.
Since section 192.06 (2) of Florida Statutes requires ownership by a municipality, 27 it is consistent with the new provision on this point.

The requirement that the property be used by the municipality itself
to qualify for the exemption appears to change the law.2 8 In Daytona Beach
Racing and Recreational Facilities District v. Paul,29 the Florida supreme
court authorized an exemption for a 374-acre tract of land owned by the city,
leased to Daytona Beach Racing and Recretational Facilities District,2 0 and
in turn subleased to the Daytona International Speedway Corporation. For
most of the year a private, profitmaking corporation was to use the property,
but still the court found a valid public purpose in the community-wide
31
economic benefits to be derived from the racing facility. The special act
granting the exemption was held valid under article IX, section 1, of the
constitution of 1885.
The new constitution does not allow an exemption where there is an
arrangement such as that in the Daytona Beach case since it requires that

FLA. STAT. §192.52 (1967).
23. FLA. CONST. art. XVI, §16 (1885) related to "the property of corporations" only.
FLA. CONsT. art. IX, §1 (1885) mentioned only the use of the property, not the ownership.
24. See City of St. Augustine v. Middleton, 147 Fla. 529, 3 So. 2d 153 (1941).
25. State v. Inter-American Center Authority, 84 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1955); Bancroft Inv.
Corp. v. City of Jacksonville, 157 Fla. 546, 27 So. 2d 162 (1946); State ex rel. Cragor Co.
v. Doss, 150 Fla. 486, 8 So. 2d 14 (1942); City of Lakeland v. Amos, 106 Fla. 873, 143 So.
744 (1932).
26. This seems to invalidate City of St. Augustine v. Middleton, 147 Fla. 529, 3 So. 2d
153 (1941).

22. FLA. STAT. §192.06(2) (1967). See also

27.

The statute says "property of.. . cities ......

28. FLA. STAr. §192.62 (1) (1967) purports to tax any property that is otherwise exempt,
but that is being used by any person or organization under a lease or other arrangement in
connection with a profitmaking venture. However, subsection (2) (a) provides that this
statute shall not apply where the property is used exclusively for municipal purposes. This
part of subsection (2) (a), which allows the arrangement contemplated by subsection (1), is
invalid because the new provision requires that the municipality use the property itself
in order to gain the exemption.
29. 179 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1965); Comment, State and Local Taxation: The Public Purpose Exemption in Florida, 18 U. FLA. L. REv. 708 (1966).
30. Act of June 23, 1955, ch. 31343, [1955] Fla. Special Acts 3675.
31. Id. at §13.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol21/iss5/5

4

Williams: Poperty Tax Exemptions under Article VII, Section 3(a) of the Flo
1969]

PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS

.

the property be used by the municipality that owns it. Section 192.06 (2)
of the Florida Statutes does not require that the municipality be the one to use
the property for a public purpose 3 2 and therefore does not comply with the
33
new constitutional requirements.
The new provision requires that to be exempt, property must be used
exclusively for municipal or public purposes. This requirement was present
in article XVI, section 16, of the old constitution, but was not found in
article IX, section 1, nor section 192.06 (2) of the Florida Statutes.3- The
requirement of exclusive use has been interpreted loosely by the Florida
supreme court.3 5 This is primarily evidenced by the doctrine allowing
"incidental private gain" 38 as long as the exempted use is the predominant
one. Thus, in spite of the apparently straightforward language of the new
provision, there is a large body of case law that can be relied upon to avoid
its exclusive use requirement. The same result may be reached by the often
broad interpretation of municipal or public purposes. 3 7 Finally, the doctrine
that tax exemption statutes will be interpreted strictly against the taxpayer 38
has been held not to apply -where a municipality is claiming an exemption. 39
In such case, exemption is the rule and taxation is the exception. This
could ease the burden on municipalities of proving exclusive use.
The wording of the new provision referring to exemption of property
used for municipal or public purposes appears to be self-executing. 0 In light
of Jasper v. Mease Manor, Inc.,41 however, this may be open to doubt. In
4
that case the Supreme Court of Florida, reversing its established position, 2
held that article XVI, section 16, was not self-executing. The decision was
based specifically upon the wording of the section, which stated that all
property of corporations would be subject to taxation unless such property

82. Note, supra note 4, at 388, But see FLA. STAT. §192.06(2) (1967) provision dealing
with municipal public utilities (added by Act of June 21, 1957, ch. 788, §1, [1957] Fla.
Laws 1113) and FLA. STAT. §192.52 (1967).
83. It is also quite doubtful whether property "intended for" public use could be
exempted as the statute provides.
84. But see FLA. STAT. §§192.06(2), (5), (6), (8), (10), (11)(a), (12), 192.061, .52
(1967).
85. Note, supra note 4, at 339.
86. State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist., 89 So. 2d. 84 (Fla.
1956); Lummus v. Florida Adirondack School, 123 Fla. 810, 168 So. 282 (1986).
87. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist. v. Paul, 179 So. 2d 349 (Fla.
1965); State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist., 89 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1956).
But see Brandes v. City of Deerfield Beach, 186 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1966).
88. Orange County v. Orlando Osteopathic Hosp., 66 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1958); Miami
Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 192 So. 211 (1939); Lummus v. Florida Adirondack
School, 128 Fla. 810, 168 So. 232 (1986).
89. Gwin v. City of Tallahassee, 132 So. 2d 273, 277 (Fla. 1961); Saunders v. City of
Jacksonville, 157 Ila. 240, 246, 25 So. 2d 648, 651 (1946). The only authority for this
proposition in Saunders was City of Eugene v. Keeney, 134 Ore. 398, 293 P. 924 (1980).
40. In such case it would have taken effect Jan. 7, 1969. Oss. A-r'y GEN. FLA. 068-108

(1968).
41. 208 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1968).
42. Cases cited note 7 supra.
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was held and used exclusively for one of the exempt purposes. 43 In addition,
the court was forced to hold that the section was not self-executing in order
to uphold a statute44 that exempted homes for the aged from taxation. The
court stated that the statute constitued a legislative definition of the constitutional term "charitable." If the court had reaffirmed the self-executing nature
of the provision, the legislature would have had no right to define a term
contained therein.
Given the unique circumstances in Mease Manor and the supreme court's
history of sustaining such legislative definitions of constitutional terms relating to tax exemptions, 45 it does not seem to be authority for declaring that
the first sentence of the new provision is not self-executing.
Assuming the municipal or public purpose exemption is self-executing,
some of the existing statutes seem unnecessary. Sections 192.06 (2) 46 and 192.52
of the Florida Statutes grant the same exemption that is now embodied in
the constitution. To the extent that such statutes are not inconsistent with
the new section, they could remain in force. It appears, however, that the
constitutional provision is adequate.
Municipally Owned Property Located Outside the Municipality
Article VII, section 3 (a) of the new constitution provides that "A
municipality, owning property outside the municipality, may be required
by general law to make payment to the taxing unit in which the property is
located." This is a limitation on the straightforward exemption in the first
sentence of the section and allows the legislature to make inroads into such
exemption. It contemplates a municipality's owning property outside its
corporate limits and (1) in the same county; (2) in another county; (3)
in another municipality; (4) in a special district; or (5) in more than one
of the foregoing. In such cases the new section allows the legislature to
require the municipality owning the property to make payment to the
respective taxing unit or units in which the property is located. The legislature may act by general law only, which excludes the possibility of numerous
special acts 47 leading to diverse and unfair treatment of municipalities and
other taxing units. The use of population acts, 48 which are general laws

43. This provision was included in the constitution to keep the legislature from exempting the property of corporations as a favor. Lummus v. Florida Adirondack School, 123
Fla. 810, 168 So. 232 (1936).
44. FLA. STAT. §192.06(14) (a) (1967).
45. State ex rel. Harper v. McDavid, 145 Fla. 605, 200 So. 100 (1941); State ex rel.
Burbridge v. St. John, 143 Fla. 544, 197 So. 131 (1940); State v. City of Tallahassee, 142 Fla.
476, 195 So. 402 (1940); City of Jacksonville v. Oldham, 112 Fla. 502, 150 So. 619 (1933).
See FLA. STAT. §§192.06(8), (10), (11)(a) (1967).
46. To the extent that it deals with the property of cities.
47. In effect this adds an additional area where special laws are prohibited. See FLA.
CONsT. art. III, §11.
48. W. HAVARD & L. BETH, THE POLITICS OF MIS-REPRESENTATION: RURAL-URBAN
CONFLICT IN THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE 185 (1962).
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applicable only to cities and counties meeting certain prerequisites based
upon population, is available.
The words "make payment" seem to allow the legislature to decide for
itself the method and amount of such payment. Possibilities include provision
for less than one hundred per cent valuation for such property, a special
rate of taxation, or a flat payment or schedule of payments to be handled
completely outside the tax structure of the unit. Because of the constitutional
authorization to the legislature, it may have a free hand to provide for plans
that would otherwise be constitutionally prohibited. 49
Currently, this situation is governed by statutes50 that exempt all property
held and used for municipal purposes regardless of location; one of which
does not expressly require exclusive use.51 Article XVI, section 16, of the
constitution of 1885, which was self-executing, 5 2 exempted property owned
by a corporation that was held and used exclusively for a municipal purpose.
In 1946, Saunders v. City of Jacksonville53 held the statutes54 constitutional
and held further that the exempt property did not have to be within the
municipality or even within the same county to enjoy the exemption. In
1961, the supreme court relied heavily on Saunders in upholding the same
statutes, as amended, in Gwin v. City of Tallahassee.5 5 In that case the City
of Tallahassee, located in Leon County, owned an electric generating plant
and transmission and distribution lines in Wakulla County. It supplied
electricity both to itself and to inhabitants of Wakulla County. The court
held the property to be exempt from taxation by Wakulla County, but did
recognize the legislature's power to allow Wakulla County to tax the property
if it so chose. 56 It seems, therefore, that the new provision merely restates the
law with the specific requirement that any change must be made by general
law.
TIEm
CHARITABLE PURPOSE

-

EXEMPTION

The exemption of property used for charitable purposes has been the
focal point of much recent legislative and judicial activity.57 Such exemp49. FLA. CONST. art. VII, §2: "All ad valorem taxation shall be at a uniform rate
within each taxing unit . . . ." FLA. CONST. art. VII, §4 requires just valuation (full cash
value) of all property for ad valorem taxation.
50. FLA. STAT. §§192.06(2), .52 (1967).
51. FLA. STAT. §192.06(2) (1967).
52. Until Jasper v. Mease Manor, Inc., 208 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1968).

53. 157 Fla. 240, 25 So. 2d 648 (1946).
54. Act of June 10, 1943, ch. 21985, §1, [1943] Fla. Laws 666.
55. 132 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1961).
56. Id. at 277. The court cited no authority for this proposition. It seems questionable
whether under article XVI, section 16, which did not refer to location of the property, the
legislature could have passed a statute taxing municipal property that was used exclusively
for a municipal purpose, even if it were located outside the municipality's corporate limits.
That would have amounted to changing the constitution, which provided (while article
XVI, section 16 was self-executing) an exemption for all corporate property used exclusively
for municipal purposes, by legislation.
57. Note, supra note 4, at 332-37, 342-51.
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tions have been governed by both the constitution and by statute. Article
XVI, section 16, of the constitution of 1885 provided an exemption for
corporate property that was used exclusively for charitable purposes. Article
IX, section 1, allowed the legislature to exempt property used for charitable
purposes. Section 192.06 (3) of the Florida Statutes 5s provides that property
of charitable institutions, if actually occupied and used by such institutions
for the purpose for which they were created, shall be exempt from taxation s9
In addition, up to seventy-five per cent of the floor space may be rented
if the revenue therefrom is applied to the purposes of the institution.60 This
provision exempts the entire property, when only as little as twenty-five per
cent of it may actually be used for the exempt purpose. This liberal attitude
is questionable under the new provision in article VII, section 3 (a), of the
constitution of 1968, which allows exemptions for "[s]uch portions of property as are used predominantly for ... charitable purposes...." In a situation where only twenty-five per cent of a charitable institution's property is
being used for charitable purposes, while seventy-five per cent is rented with
the proceeds applied to charitable purposes, it appears that the new provision
61
contemplates an exemption for only twenty-five per cent of the property,
since that is the portion being used for the exempt purpose. This is more in
keeping with section 192.06 (10) of the Florida Statutes and the legislative
philosophy it reflects. The section provides that labor union halls shall be
exempt from taxation, but if any part of such halls is not used strictly for
union business it shall be subject to taxation as any other property. 62 Florida
Statutes, section 192.06 (3), appears to be inconsistent with the new constitution, unless the courts read the requirement of the statute that the rental
proceeds be applied to the exempt purpose as relating to the use of the
property for the exempt purpose. This, however, would be a wholly artificial
interpretation. 63 Even if the statute were amended to provide, for instance,
that only twenty-five per cent of the floor space may be rented, this would
58. "Such property of educational, literary, benevolent, fraternal, charitable and scientific institutions within this state, as shall actually be occupied and used by them for the
purpose for which they have been or may be organized, provided, not more than seventyfive per cent of the floor space of said building or property is rented, and the rents, issues,
and profits of said property are used for the educational, literary, benevolent, fraternal,
charitable or scientific purposes of said institutions ......
59. This statute used to require the property to be used solely for the exempt purpose
until Act of May 14, 1937, ch. 18312, [1937] Fla. Laws 1124.
60. This provision was upheld in State ex rel. Cragor Co. v. Doss, 150 Fla. 486, 8 So.
2d 15 (1942).
61. Division of property for tax purposes has been allowed before. See State ex rel.
Cragor Co. v. Doss, 150 Fla. 486, 8 So. 2d 15 (1942).
62. It is difficult to see how an exemption for labor union halls can be justified under
the constitution, new or old. The statute exempts real property used exclusively by the
There are no cases
union for "meeting halls, training halls or educational purposes .
dealing with the constitutionality of this statute.
63. See, e.g., Panama City v. Pledger, 140 Fla. 629, 192 So. 470 (1939), where a city
leased property to a private corporation, the revenue to go into the city treasury to be used
for public purposes. The court held that this was not using the property for a public
purpose.
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not bring the statute within constitutional guidelines since only such portions
of property as are used for the authorized purpose may be exempted. If any
part of the property were rented, it would appear subject to taxation unless
it was also used for a charitable or other authorized purpose.
The charitable purpose exemption is hard to cover with a general
definition. Consequently, the courts have looked at each case individually and
examined the character, function, and purpose of each institution claiming
the exemption. The determination is made on an individual basis.Homes for the aged and their exempt status as charitable institutions have
been a recurring question to the courts and legislature. 5 In section 192.06 (3)
of the Florida Statutes,66 the legislature failed to provide any indication as
to what "charitable" meant. In Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home,67
the Second District Court of Appeal held that where a home for the aged
required a founder's fee of from 5,000 to 7,000 dollars and also required the
applicant to enter a contract to pay 150 dollars per month for life, the fact
that one resident paid nothing and many others did not pay the full monthly
fee did not entitle the home to an exemption under Florida Statutes, section
192.06 (3). The court adopted a fairly restrictive definition of "charitable,"
limiting it to "gifts to the poor or positive steps taken to relieve distress
and suffering of those unable to help themselves."68 Less than two years later,
on facts strikingly similar to those in Haines, the Florida supreme court, using
only article XVI, section 16, of the constitution of 1885 as a guide, held that
another home for the aged was not entitled to an exemption.6 9 Subsequently,
the 1965 session of the legislature passed section 192.06 (14) (a) of the Florida
71
Statutes,"0 specifically exempting homes for the aged as of January 1, 1968.
This statute exempted homes such as those in Haines and Presbyterian
Homes.
When the statute was attacked by tax officials, the Florida supreme court
held, in Jasperv. Mease Manor,Inc., 72 that the statute constituted a definition
by the legislature of "charitable" as used in the constitution and that such
was within the legislative prerogative. The court stated that there must be
only a reasonable relationship between the specific statutory exemption and a
purpose the constitution required to be served.7 3 Thus, since the legislature
had declared that certain property was used for charitable purposes, the
court abandoned its prior judicial definitions7 4 In Memorial Home Cor64. Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176, 181 (2d D.C.A.
Fla. 1965). See also Note, supra note 4, at 343.
65. Note, supra note 4, at 347-48.
66. Note 58 supra.
67. 173 So. 2d 176 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965), cert. denied, 183 So. 2d 211 (Fla.1967).
68. Id. at 181.
69. Presbyterian Homes of the Synod v. City of Bradenton, 190 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1966).
70. Act of June 25, 1965, ch. 65-438, [1965] Fla. Laws 1559.
71. Act of Aug. 4, 1967, ch. 67-568, [1967] Fla. Laws 1669, significantly restricted this
statute by adding subsections (b) and (c).

72. 208 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1968).
73. Id. at 825.
74. The court had, however, never specifically accepted the Haines definition.
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munity v. Smiths7 5 the First District Court of Appeal relied on Mease Manor,
and upon section 192.06 (14), to expand the definition of "charitable" under
the broad language of section 192.06 (3) to include the types of homes for
the aged that had previously been denied exemptions.
"Benevolent," as well as charitable purposes are included in Florida
Statutes, section 192.06 (3), as grounds for exemption. This word was used
in neither of the old constitutional provisions 76 nor in the new provision. The
weight of authority seems to be that "benevolent," as used in tax exemption
statutes, is synonymous with "charitable. 77 Although this has not been
authoritatively stated by the Florida supreme court, the Second District Court
of Appeal in Haines held that "benevolent" and "charitable" as used in
Florida Statutes, section 192.06 (3), are synonymous. 78 If this is the case,
"benevolent" is merely excess verbiage and should be removed from the
statute. If it means something other than "charitable" its inclusion in the
statute should be held invalid as not authorized by the constitution, 9
The same statute also exempts property used for "fraternal" purposes.8 0
This terminology was not authorized in the old constitution and is not in
the new provision. Certainly the word "fraternal" cannot be considered to
be synonymous with "charitable" or any other of the constitutionally enumerated purposes. All the cases involving exemptions for fraternal organizations, however, seem to equate them with charitable organizations or assume
that they also serve charitable purposes. 81 Since it has been a longstanding
8
practice to exempt the property of fraternal organizations from taxation, 2
even without specific constitutional authorization, it seems unlikely that
the courts will change their interpretation of section 192.06 (3) in its
application to fraternal organizations. This is especially true since under
the new provision exemptions are authorized for property that is used
for predominantly charitable purposes. A plausible argument could be made
that at least some fraterial organizations are organized for predominantly
charitable purposes. The better approach would be to grant such organiza-

75. 214 So. 2d 77 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
76. FLA. CONsr. art IX, §1 (1885); FLA. CONsr. art. XVI, §16 (1885).
77. See, e.g., Sarah Dix Hamlin School v. City and County of San Francisco, 221 Cal.
App. 2d 336, 34 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1963); Holbrook Island Sanctuary v. Inhabitants of the
Town of Brooksville, 161 Me. 476, 483-84, 214 A.2d 660, 664 (1965); Assessors of Lancaster
v. Perkins School, 323 Mass. 418, 420, 82 N.E.2d 883, 884 (1948); Oregon Methodist Homes,
Inc. v. Horn, 226 Ore. 298, 309, 360 P.2d 293, 298 (1960); 14 C.J.S. Charities §1 (1939).
Contra, Order of Sisters of St. Joseph v. Town of Plover, 239 Wis. 278, 281, 1 N.W.2d 173,
174 (1941). See generally 5 WORDS AND PHRASES Benevolent (1968).
78. 173 So. 2d 176, 181 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
79. Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 192 So. 211 (1939).
80. FLA. STAT. §192.06(3) (1967). See also Fla. Stat. §637.60 (1957), now essentially the
same in FLA. STAT. §632.431 (1967), providing exemptions for some fraternal societies, but
excepting taxes on real estate and office equipment.
81. E.g., Rogers v. City of Leesburg, 157 Fla. 784, 27 So. 2d 70 (1946); State ex rel.
Cragor Co. v. Doss, 150 Fla. 486, 8 So. 2d 15 (1942); Grand Lodge Independent Order of
Archery of State of Fla. v. City of Live Oak, 130 Fla. 386, 177 So. 738 (1938).
82. Rogers v. City of Leesburg, 157 Fla. 784, 786, 27 So. 2d 70, 71 (1946).
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tions an exemption because they are used for charitable purposes and
remove "fraternal" from the statute.
EDUCATIONAL,

LITERARY, SCIENTIFIC, AND RELIGIOUS

PURPOSES

In addition to charitable purposes, article VII, section 3 (a), of the new
constitution authorizes exemptions for property used for educational, literary,
scientific, or religious purposes. These were all authorized under the two
provisions in the old constitution, so the body of law that has developedrelating to the character of each of these purposes remains valid. The
problems discussed in the previous section with reference to the rental
provisions of Florida Statutes, section 192.06 (3), apply equally to these purposes since they are included in that statute.
The new section allows exemptions for property used predominantly for
the enumerated purposes. This definitely eliminates the "exclusive use"
requirement of the old article XVI, section 16. It also appears to authorize
the legislature to go beyond the limits of the judicially established "incidental
private gain" doctrine, which has been used to temper the exclusive use
requirements. 8 3 The definition of "predominantly" in this context, however,
remains doubtful.8 4 It would seem that the new constitution requires that,
to be exempt under a statute, property must be used to a significant degree
for the authorized purpose. There are no cases in Florida defining this term,
so the result will probably be a case-by-case approach, possibly similar to the
courts' approach in defining "charitable purposes." As an alternative, the
legislature, when it drafts implementing statutes, could adopt formulas
specifying certain percentages of time that the property must be used, or
percentages of floorspace that must be used, for the exempted purpose.
The new provision bases its authorization of exemptions solely on the
character of the use of the property. It does not mention ownership. Section 192.06 (3) of the Florida Statutes, exempting property used for educational, literary, benevolent, fraternal, charitable, and scientific purposes, however, requires the property to be owned by the institution and occupied and
used by it for the purpose for which it was organized.8 5 These requirements
are inconsistent with the language of the new provision, which seems to
allow the legislature to pass general laws exempting property used for the
enumerated purposes even if it is owned by individuals or profitmaking
corporations, who are receiving large rents for the use of such property. The
question is whether the strict requirements in the statute are invalid merely
because the constitution would permit the legislature to pass a more wide83. State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist., 89 So. 2d 34 (Fla.
1956); Lummus v. Florida Adirondack School, 123 Fla. 810, 168 So. 232 (1936). But see
Brandes v. City of Deerfield Beach, 186 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1966).
84. "Predominant" is defined as "[H]olding an ascendancy: having superior strength,
influence, authority, or position: controlling, dominating, prevailing." WEas'mR's NEW
INTERNATIONAL DIaIONARY (3d ed. 1961).
85. Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 192 So. 211 (1939); Coppock v. Blount,
145 So. 2d 279 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
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reaching exemption statute. Some light is shed on this question when it is
observed that article IX, section 1, under which the statute in question was
passed, did not require that the property be owned by an institution created
for an exempt purpose. Since the statute was never invalidated as an
attempted extension of the constitution by legislation the argument could
be made that the constitution provides only a minimum requirement that
the property be put to a certain use, and it is within the legislature's power
to impose further restrictions when passing implementing legislation. 6 The
other view would be that the constitution has set out specific requirements
and to extend them by statute amounts to an attempted amendment of the
87
constitution by legislation.
Other examples of the legislature's imposition of further requirements
than those specified by the constitution are the statutes passed under article
IX, section 1, of the constitution of 1885 which require the property to be used
exclusively for the exempt purpose.8 8 Since the new provision requires the
property to be used only predominantly for the exempt purpose, it is possible
that these statutes will be successfully attacked now. The old provision,
article IX, section 1, was noncommital on the question of the quantitative
measure of use required. It had been held only that the legislature did not
have to require exclusive use, not that it could not if it so desired. The
inclusion in the new provision of the word "predominantly," thus quantitatively specifiying the use required, could cause the courts to hold that
statutes requiring exclusive use for the exempt purpose are invalid as
attempted extensions of the constitution by legislation.
Under the bare requirements of the new section privately-owned property
could be leased for a large rent to, for instance, an educational institution,
and thus receive an exemption. This seems unfair. Under the current
statute, 89 however, if privately owned property were leased to the same educational institution for no payment, the property could still be taxable to the
owner.90 This, also, is an unfair result. Apparently, under the new provision
the legislature would be authorized to pass a statute allowing an exemption
to the owner in such a situation only if he were receiving below a certain
maximum rent, possibly a percentage of the assessed value of the property.
The last sentence of article VII, section 3 (a), is not self-executing. It
differs from article IX, section 1,91 of the constitution of 1885, which also was
not self-executing, at least in one respect. The old provision allowed property
to be exempted "by law," while under the new section such exemptions must
be by general law. 92 Thus, before the new constitution, the legislature could
86. Gamma Phi Chapter of Sigma Chi Bldg. Fund Corp. v. Dade County, 199 So. 2d
717 (Fla. 1967), upholding FLA. STAT. §192.062 (1967).
87. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist. v. Paul, 157 So. 2d 156 (1st
D.C.A. Fla. 1963), quashed on other grounds, 179 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1965).
88. FLA. STAT. §§192.06(2), (5), (6), (8), (10), (11)(a), (12), .061, .52, .62(1), (2)(a)
(1967).
89.

FLA. STAT.

§192.06(3)

(1967).

90. But see Coppock v. Blount, 145 So. 2d 279 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
91. And FLA. CONST. art. XVI, §16 (1885) after the Mease Manor case.
92. This is an additional limitation as discussed in note 47 supra.
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pass special acts granting exemptions to individual parcels of property.93
Given the provincial nature of special legislation, and the lack of interest
taken therein by the legislature as a whole, 94 elimination of its use in such
an area of vital statewide concern as tax exemptions is a significant improvement. Population acts, or general laws of local application, apparently could
not be used to achieve the same objective since they apply to counties or
cities as a whole 95 and not to individual pieces of property.
Florida Statutes, section 199.03 (1)96 exempts all intangible personal
property owned by any religious, charitable, benevolent, or educational
association.1 This exemption is based solely on the character of the ownership of the intangible personal property98 and makes no reference to its use.
In a situation where an educational institution held intangible personal
property, the income from which was not being used for educational or any
other exempt purposes, the validity of the exemption granted by this statute
would be highly questionable under the new provision, which is based solely
on the character of use of the property.
Section 192.06 (4) of the Florida Statutes,99 exempting certain property
used for religious purposes, seems to be much more consistent with the new
constitutional provision. It does not base its exemption on ownership and
does not expressly require exclusive use. The statute provides that if any house
of worship is rented for any other purpose than schooling or places of worship, the exemption will be forfeited.
RELATIvE

FUNCTIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE AND THE JUDICIARY

The new provision grants vast power to the legislature with regard to tax
exemptions. It may grant these exemptions, however, only to property used
for those purposes specified in the constitution. 00 These purposes are subject
to varied interpretations, but in the final analysis it should be the task of
the judiciary to decide whether a type of property exempted by statute fits
under the constitutional authorizations. On various occasions the Florida
legislature has undertaken to define constitutional terms with regard to tax

93. See Act of June 16, 1947, ch. 24579, §5, [1947] Fla. Special Acts 1434; Act of June
23, 1955, ch. 31343, §13, [1955] Fla. Special Acts 3675.
94. Supra note 48, at 184.
95. Id.
96. Act of June 25, 1965, ch. 65-389, §, [1965] Fla. Laws 1363 (previously Fla. Stat.
§199.02 (5) (1963)).
97. It is interesting to note that fraternal, scientific, and literary purposes are not
present in this statute.
98. See [1953-1954] FLA. ATr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 212.
99. "All houses of public worship and lots on which they are situated, and all pews or
steps and furniture therein, every parsonage and all burying grounds not owned or held by
individuals or corporations for speculative purposes, tombs and right of burial; but any
building being a house of worship-which shall be rented or hired for any other purpose
except for schools or places of worship, shall be taxed the same as any other property."
100. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist. v. Paul, 157 So. 2d 156 (1st
D.C.A. Fla. 1963), quashed on other grounds, 179 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1965).
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exemptions. 101 This is acceptable as long as the courts agree with the
102
legislature's definition. In a situation such as was involved in Mease Manor,
however, the supreme court and the legislature did not agree. The court
had for several years subscribed to a fairly restrictive definition of "charitable
purposes." Then, after the legislature passed a more liberal statute exempting
homes for the aged as being used for charitable purposes, the court withdrew
1 3
from its position and deferred to the legislature. 0
Regardless of the presumption in favor of the constitutionality of statutes,
the judiciary has a responsibility to the citizens of Florida to insure that
exemption statutes do not go beyond constitutional limits so as to erode tax
sources. Tax exemptions are said to be special favors, which should be
strictly construed against those claiming them.104 Perhaps it is time for the
judiciary to impose an analogous rule with regard to tax exemption legislation,
construing it strictly in light of the constitution. This would seem to be more
in the state's interest than the "reasonable relationship" test adopted in
Mease Manor. The adoption of the new constitution provides an opportunity
for the judiciary to reassume its function as the final arbiter on questions of
constitutional interpretation in the area of tax exemptions.
CONCLUSION

In several areas, article VII, section 3 (a), does not appear to change the
law. Each of the purposes for which it grants an exemption or authorizes
the legislature to grant an exemption was included in the old constitution
and is found in current statutes. The cases that have been concerned with
interpreting and defining these purposes remain good law. In addition, the
power of the legislature to provide that municipal property located outside
the municipality's corporate limits may be subject to taxation has not been
changed.
The changes that have been brought about by the new section, however,
seem far-reaching. A municipality must now own and use property itself in
order for such property to qualify for a public purpose exemption. It must
be used exclusively for the public purpose. As has been pointed out, this
is not as formidable a requirement as it appears on its face, due to the various
methods of avoiding it.
The authorization of exemptions for property used for educational,
literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes seems to invalidate the
rental provisions of Florida Statutes, section 192.06 (3), a major tax exemption
statute. The new section requires property to be divided according to its
101. E.g., FLA. STAT. §§192.06(8), (10), (11) (a) (1967).
102. 208 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1968).
103. See State v. Ocean Highway & Port Authority, 217 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1968), where
the Florida supreme court abandoned its established position that revenue bonds could
not be issued to construct industrial plants that were to be leased to private industry,
because such was not a public purpose. The court based this decision on Fla. Laws 1967,
ch. 67-1748, which stated that the proposed bond issue was for a public purpose.
104. Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 728, 192 So. 211, 216 (1939).
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use for tax purposes. It now contains a specific quantitative measure of the
use required to meet constitutional requirements. This measure, characterized
by the word "predominantly," is wide open to interpretation. The status
of the many statutes that impose more stringent standards than those in the
new provision remains uncertain.
The apparently self-executing exemption for property used for municipal
or public purposes may make all statutes relating to such property obsolete.
Section 192.06 (2), as it applies to property owned by cities, appears to be
invalid because it does not include the new requirement that the municipality
owning the property be the one to use it for the public purpose.
Exemptions granted to public libraries, agricultural societies, widows,
the American Legion, veterans' organizations, hospitals, and medical societies
under section 192.06 of the Florida Statutes will retain their current, somewhat uncertain, status. It is often hard to fit some of these exemptions under
the constitutionally authorized purposes. They were and will continue to be
open to attack on these grounds. Finally, the new section specifically prohibits the use of special legislation in granting these tax exemptions.
Article VII, section 3 (a), of the new constitution will require extensive
interpretation by the Florida courts. It is imposible to tell ahead of time
what its provisions will mean. Regardless, however, of -the problems of
interpretation, the new section is a step toward the objective of a simplified
and streamlined Florida constitution.
ROBERT F. WLLIAMS
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